We used Bayesian methods to compare the predictions of probabilistic risk assessment -the theoretical tool used by the nuclear industry to predict the frequency of nuclear accidents -with empirical data. The existing record of accidents with some simplifying assumptions regarding their probability distribution is sufficient to rule out the validity of the industry's analyses at a very high confidence level. The debate on nuclear liability indicates that the industry has independently arrived at this conclusion. We also discuss the Indian situation, where we show that the existing operating experience provides insufficient data to make any reliable claims about the safety of future reactors. We briefly discuss some policy implications.
Introduction
There has been much recent debate about the safety of nuclear reactors in India. The nuclear establishment has often expressed its absolute confidence in the safety of Indian plants. For example, the previous chairperson of the Atomic Energy Commission declared that the chance of a nuclear accident in India was "1-in-infinity" [1] .
Similar statements can be found in the scholarly literature and are supported by an analytic framework called "probabilistic risk assessment" (PRA) that we will discuss in this paper. Using this methodology, officials from the Nuclear Power Corporation of India (NPCIL) concluded that the Core-Damage Frequency (CDF) of the Kudankulam reactors -the rate at which the reactor is expected to suffer accidents that damage its core -was just 10 −7 per reactor-year (ry) [2] . The other two multinational companies that are in line to construct reactors in India -the French company, Areva, whose European Pressurised Reactors (EPRs) have been selected for Jaitapur (Maharashtra) and the the American company Westinghouse, whose AP1000 reactors have been selected for Mithi Virdi (Gujarat) -have also put forward similar figures. For example, Areva claims that the CDF of the EPR is 7.08 × 10 −7 (ry) −1 . (See p. 2 of [3] .) Westinghouse has estimated the CDF of the AP1000 to be 5.09 × 10 −7 (ry) −1 . (See Table 5-1 and Table 8 -2 of [4] .)
Prima facie, it is prudent to treat such low numbers skeptically, especially when they are provided with a precision of two decimal places. A nuclear reactor is a very complex system, and our understanding of its dynamics, particularly when they are coupled to an uncertain external environment, is not advanced enough to permit such accurate estimates.
Nevertheless, these numbers are taken seriously by regulators, both in India and elsewhere. In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has set a goal for PRA estimates of both the CDF and the large-release frequency (LRF). The latter involves accidents where the containment fails in addition to core damage. These are expected to be below 10 −4 (ry) −1 and 10 −6 (ry) −1 respectively. (See [5] and Appendix D of [6] .) Similar quantitative criterion have been adopted in other countries [7] . In India, licensing guidelines suggest that new plants should have a PRA-estimated CDF smaller than 10 −5 (ry) −1 and a LRF lower than 10 −6 (ry) −1 . (See Annexure-1 of [8] .) The methodology used to carry out PRAs in the nuclear industry, which we review in section 2, is theoretically suspect. However, the purpose of this article is to point out that, even setting aside theoretical considerations, these extraordinarily low bounds can be ruled out by using the existing empirical record of nuclear accidents.
There have already been eight core-damage accidents in a little more than fifteen thousand reactor-years of experience as we review in section 3. Hence, the observed frequency of accidents is significantly higher than that predicted by the industry's PRAs. Moreover, and this is the crucial conclusion of this paper: had the true frequency of accidents been as low as the manufacturers claim, it is exceedingly unlikely that so many accidents could have occurred. Conversely, the historical record on accidents implies that, even under rather conservative assumptions, it is possible to conclude with a very high degree of confidence that the results of the industry's PRAs are incorrect.
For example, we show in section 4 that with favourable assumptions for the industry, the hypothesis that the frequency of core-damage accidents is smaller than or equal to 10 −7 (ry) −1 can be ruled out with a confidence of 1.0 − 4.0 × 10 −24 . Said differently, we can conclude that the core-damage frequency of nuclear reactors is higher than this with a confidence of 99.9999999999999999999996%! We then turn briefly to India's operating experience in section 5 where we make the elementary statistical point that the existing experience of Indian reactor operation is insufficient to derive any strong conclusions about expected accident frequencies in the future. In section 6, we briefly discuss the debate on liability because it shows that the nuclear industry has itself reached the conclusion that the quantitative results of PRA should not be taken seriously. We conclude in section 7.
A Brief Review of Probabilistic Risk Assessment
The use of PRA in the nuclear industry started with the Rasmussen report [9] . The basic idea is to enumerate the possible fault trees that could lead to an accident. For each individual component in the reactor, one can estimate a frequency of failure. For a serious accident, some combination of these components has to fail simultaneously. The industry advertises a philosophy of "defense in depth", which reduces the overall possibility of an accident by building redundancy into a system. The low numbers above result from the fact that several systems have to fail simultaneously before the core is damaged.
For example, Keller and Modarres [10] report that in 1966, in one of the earliest such assessments, the General Electric company "showed" that its reactors "had a onein-a-million chance per year for a catastrophic failure because each of the three major subsystems would only fail once-in-one-hundred per years."
The theoretical problem with such estimates is obvious. Consider the Fukushima nuclear complex, which had 13 backup diesel generators [11] . Assigning a probability of 10 −1 for the failure of each generator per year and assuming that they are independent would lead us to the naive conclusion that the probability that 12 generators would fail together in any given year is about 13 × 10 −12 × 0.9 ≈ 10 −11 . However, the tsunami did precisely this by disabling all but one of the generators at once.
The point is that once the obvious fault trees have been eliminated and corrected, we reach a stage where the dominant contributions to accident-probabilities come from unlikely sequences of events that conspire to cause a failure. A nuclear reactor is not only a complex system, it is also an open system that is coupled to an external environment. This makes it virtually impossible to foresee all sorts of low probability pathways to failure. Furthermore, our understanding of the frequency of extreme initiating events, such as tsunamis and earthquakes, is itself rather crude. These error bars overwhelm the seemingly accurate predictions that result from elaborate simulations of the reactor.
However, instead of venturing deeper into these theoretical arguments, we will examine how the predictions of PRA stand up against the extant empirical data.
To facilitate this comparison, let us summarize the various kinds of claims that have been made by the three multinational companies relevant to India. As we mentioned, Areva has estimated that the CDF of an EPR accounting for both internal and external hazards is 7.08 × 10 −7 (ry) −1 . −7 (ry) −1 , we were unable to locate the details of the PRA that led to this conclusion. So, we will take this figure as is, and consider a LRF of 10 −8 (ry) −1 using the common estimate that the LRF "is generally about ten times less than CDF" [13] . All these claims are summarized in Table 1 
Review of the Empirical Experience
We now review the historical record on nuclear accidents. The industry, as a whole, had gathered about T obs = 15247 reactor-years of operating experience by the end of 2012 according to the latest data put out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). (See Table 4 of [14] .) In this time, there have been several core-damage accidents. Surprisingly, the IAEA does not maintain a comprehensive historical record of core-damage accidents. Cochran and McKinzie have compiled a very useful list of 25 such instances from various sources [15] . In our analysis, we will only consider accidents that occurred at commercial reactors, thus excluding accidents at experimental facilities like Enrico Fermi Unit-1 (1966) or Lucens (1969) . Even this enumeration is somewhat subjective, but a conservative approach, keeping only accidents that involved a significant meltdown of fuel leads to the list in Table 2 . In each case, we have also provided references to more detailed descriptions of these accidents. three at Fukushima. Since we have PRA results for both the CDF and the LRF, we can compare these separately to the historical record. The reason for counting the three accidents at Fukushima separately in the list above is that we are interested in the rate of accidents per reactor-year of operation, and all these three reactors contribute separately to the "total operating experience" that appears in the denominator.
We comment more on this issue in section 7. However, to demonstrate the robust nature of our conclusions, we will present a parallel analysis where the accidents at Fukushima are counted together. By this (incorrect) counting, there have been n cd low = 6 core-damage accidents and n lr low = 3 accidents with a large release of radioactivity. 
Accident Frequencies and Probabilistic Risk Assessment
Counting the Fukushima accidents as a single accident, we find
It is clear that these empirically observed frequencies are far higher than the predictions of the manufacturers' PRAs. However, we can ask a more detailed question: given the observed rate of accidents, what is the probability that the results of PRA are close to, or smaller than, the "true frequency" of accidents.
This is a standard Bayesian question. To answer this, we need to make a few simplifying assumptions about the probability distribution of nuclear accidents. We start by assuming that nuclear accidents are independent events, and that in every small time interval dt, each reactor has a small and constant probability dp = λ dt,
of suffering an accident. In section 7 we discuss possible refinements of this model, including variations in λ by region, design, and in time, as the reactor ages. However, since nuclear accidents can happen at any time, and can be initiated by several possible unpredictable events -including natural disasters, design defects and operator errors -we expect (4.2) to give us an excellent first approximation. Say that we have m reactors functioning simultaneously which we observe for a time period τ = Ndt. The probability for n of these to have undergone accidents is
where, in the last line, we have taken the continuous limit: N → ∞, with τ finite. We remind the reader that Γ(n + 1) = n! is the standard Gamma function. We now consider the case where λτ ≪ 1, which implies that the chance of any individual reactor undergoing an accident is small, and n ≪ m, which states that only a small fraction of all reactors undergo an accident. In this limit, the total operating experience gathered becomes T = mτ , and we see that the distribution simplifies to
This is just a Poisson distribution and we could even have started with this distribution, which is commonly used to model accidents and other rare events in various scenarios.
It is now possible to solve the following Bayesian problem: start with the prior assumption that λ is uniformly distributed
where λ c is an irrelevant high frequency cutoff to make the distribution normalizable. Given the observed frequency of events above, what is the posterior probability distribution for λ?
Let us try and explain this in simple words. Say we start with no prior bias for the value of λ. Given that we have some number n obs of accidents, we can use this empirical data to form an estimate as to the value of λ. In fact, Bayes theorem tells us that we can actually calculate the probability that the true frequency of accidents has a value between λ and λ + dλ through the formula P(λ|n obs ) = P(n obs |λ)P(λ) P(n obs ) .
This formula is just making precise that intuition that the empirical evidence is giving us some information about the value of λ in our world. On the right hand side, P(n obs |λ) = p λ (n obs ), which is given by the Poisson distribution (4.3). P(λ) is our flat prior probability distribution in (4.4). To fix P(n obs ), which is a λ independent constant, we can simply demand that ∞ 0 P(λ|n obs )dλ = 1. After fixing this constant we find that the posterior probability distribution for λ is given by P(λ|n obs ) = 1 Γ(n obs + 1)
T obs (λT obs ) n obs e −λT obs , (4.5)
where we have neglected terms of O e −λcT obs , assuming λ c is taken to be large enough. This function is plotted in figure 1 for the values of n obs that are relevant to both the large-release and the core-damage frequency.
We pause to mention a somewhat subtle point. Since the observed number of events is small, n obs ∼ O (1), the curves in figure 1 have an appreciable width. This indicates that it is not possible to adopt a purely frequentist approach to nuclear accidents. Such an approach may be useful in situations where we have a large number of events at hand, but Bayesian methods are essential for our analysis.
The physical significance of (4.5) becomes evident when we consider the probability that the probability that λ is smaller than any given λ 0 . This function is given by C(λ 0 , n obs ) = Since the probability that the true frequency is smaller than the various results of PRA is so close to zero, it cannot be read off the graph. However, we can use the series expansion
This leads to the numerical figures given in Table 3 . The phrase "PRA ... is right" is shorthand for the hypothesis that the true frequency of accidents is lower than or equal to the frequency predicted by PRA. Therefore, the table lists the values of the function C(λ 0 , n obs ) from (4.6) with λ 0 set to the PRA-predicted frequency and n obs set to the observed number of accidents, which varies depending on whether the Fukushima accidents are counted together or separately. One observes immediately that, given the empirical data, the probability that the industry's PRA-based conclusions are right is astronomically small. As we stated in the introduction, this implies that with almost perfect certainty we can conclude that the true frequency of accidents is much larger than the figures advertised by the manufacturers.
We emphasize that the figures in Table 3 should not be used as precise numerical bounds on the validity of the PRA results. They suffer from the uncertainty that we have already mentioned above: the assumption that the observed events are drawn from the same underlying Poisson distribution.
Regardless of this caveat, the results of Table 3 are so strong that they lead to the following straightforward conclusion: the historical data on nuclear accidents provides overwhelming evidence that the methodology of probabilistic risk assessment is seriously flawed. Moreover the observed frequency of accidents contradicts the industry's claim that the probability of an accident is negligible.
On the Indian Experience
We now turn to the Indian experience. Here, we show that India's operating experience of T ind = 394 reactor years [24] is too low to provide any meaningful information about the relative safety of the Indian nuclear programme compared to other countries.
There have been several minor but no major accidents in India's operating history. We again start with a flat prior distribution for the mean frequency of accidents at Indian reactors, which we denote by λ ind to distinguish it from the global frequency. Then the posterior distribution for λ ind is given by
Note we can obtain this by setting n obs → 0 and T obs → T ind in (4.5). This curve is plotted in figure 3 . To make this sharper, it is useful to look at the probability for the hypothesis that λ ind < λ 0 . This probability is given by the function
This curve is shown in figure 4 . Some relevant numerical figures are
In words, this indicates that it is only with a confidence of about 10% that we can state that the true frequency of accidents is smaller than once in 3700 reactor-years. And it is only with a confidence of about 33% that we can conclude that the true frequency of accidents in India is smaller than once per thousand reactor-years. These results are very simple to understand intuitively. They simply reflect the fact that even if the expected frequency of accidents in India is once every thousand reactor-years, there is still an excellent chance that one could get through 394 reactoryears without an accident. Conversely, the absence of an accident in this time period is not particularly informative. It is quite common to find claims like the one made by the Indian Nuclear Society its advertisement for a 2012 conference. "Having achieved safe and reliable operation of about 360 reactor-years . . . the Indian nuclear programme has demonstrated a high level of maturity. The safety track record of Indian nuclear power plants has been impeccable" [25] . These claims are accepted at the highest levels of government. In 2011, the Prime Minister stated that "The safety track record of our nuclear power plants over the past 335 reactor-years of operation has been impeccable" [26] . Our analysis shows that it is erroneous to draw these complacent conclusions. India's operating experience is too limited to provide statistically reliable long term estimates about the efficacy or otherwise of safety practices in the nuclear sector.
In passing, we should point out that, within the nuclear industry, it appears to be a rather common statistical error to extrapolate from limited experience to rather strong claims of safety. For example, the Rasmussen report also stated that "It is significant that in some 200 reactor-years of commercial operation of reactors of the type considered in the report there have been no fuel melting accidents." (See p. 6 of [9] .) However, this experience had absolutely no significance for the conclusion drawn by the report, which was that the core-damage frequency of reactors was once in 20,000 years (p. 8).
The Debate on Nuclear Liability
It is clear that the results of PRA are untenable in the light of empirical data. In this section we provide evidence, using the debate on nuclear liability, that the industry's actions (as opposed to its public statements) suggest that it has independently reached this conclusion.
It is well known that soon after the nuclear deal, multinational nuclear suppliers lobbied the government to pass a law that would indemnify them in the event of an accident. Under this pressure, the government passed a liability law in 2010 that was almost identical to the annex of a U.S. sponsored international convention on the subject called the Convention on Supplementary Compensation [27, 28] . However, as a result of various pulls-and-pushes in the legislative process, nuclear suppliers are largely protected but not completely indemnified by the Indian law. While victims cannot sue the supplier, the law allows the NPCIL, which has the primary responsibility of compensating victims, to recover some of this compensation from the supplier for a disaster caused by substandard equipment. The refusal of suppliers to accept even this marginal liability has held up negotiations to the extent that not a single new contract for reactors has been signed after the nuclear deal! However, this leads directly to the following question: if the chance of a nuclear accident is indeed as remote as the industry claims, then why are nuclear reactor manufacturers unwilling to accept liability for an accident?
One of the ostensible reasons given by suppliers is that forcing them to accept liability would cause the cost of power to go up [29] . To examine the veracity of this claim, consider the expected cost of insurance for suppliers if the results of PRA are taken at face value by the industry and actuaries [30] .
The Indian liability law caps the total available compensation for victims at Rs. 2,500 crores, and victims are not legally entitled to any further compensation. We denote this cap by ℓ cap = Rs. 2, 500 crores = Rs. 2.5 × 10 10 . If one accepts the claimed frequency of accidents, µ kk = 10 −7 (ry) −1 , then a simple order of magnitude estimate for the cost of insurance is
A reactor with a capacity of 1000 MW, operating at a 80% load-factor, should produce E = 0.8 × 10
6 × 365 × 24 kWh ≈ 7 × 10 9 kWh of electricity each year. So, the cost of insurance above should lead to an increase in the cost of electricity by
This absurdly small number indicates that something is amiss with the industry's claim that liability will lead to price increases. In fact two factors of about about 10 3 and 10 4 , which are missing in the calculation above, are required to make sense of the industry's reluctance. The first is that nuclear accidents could lead to damage that is a thousand times more than the cap on liability. For example, some estimates of the economic damage at Fukushima are as high as ℓ real ≈ USD 200 billion ≈ Rs. 12 lakh crores. (See Table 4 of [31] .)
In principle, a future Indian government could ignore the liability cap and insist on recovering larger costs from the supplier. Even this would not lead to a prohibitive cost of insurance if reactors were genuinely as safe as manufacturers' claim. The other crucial missing factor comes from our result above: accidents affecting the public are likely to happen at a rate that is closer to ν lr obs . Extending our simple linear model with these realistic estimates of damage and risk leads to the following cost of insurance per unit energy produced
This is now a significant fraction (roughly 10%) of the cost of electricity. However, at this point, corrections to our linear model for the insurance premium become significant. For example, since the total amount involved, ℓ real , is very high, and the expected rate ν lr obs is non-negligible, financial institutions would evidently be unwilling to underwrite this risk without additional incentives in the form of a significantly higher cost of insurance. This helps explain why suppliers insist on legislative indemnity, rather than simply arranging for the appropriate financial cover.
What the debate on liability shows is that the nuclear industry has itself taken note of the empirical rates of accidents, and it is unwilling to take the predictions of its PRAs seriously when its economic interests are at stake.
Conclusions and Discussions
In this paper, by means of some simple Bayesian calculations, we have come to two conclusions.
1. The historical record contradicts the predictions of probabilistic risk assessment and suggests a significantly higher risk of nuclear accidents.
2. India's current experience with nuclear reactor operation is far from sufficient to draw any strong conclusions about future reactor safety.
These qualitative conclusions are very robust against changes in our detailed assumptions. However, it is useful to consider some refinements of our model, which was based on the assumption (4.2). One suggestion that is often encountered is that λ should decrease with time, as the nuclear industry collectively gathers more experience. This is closely related to the argument that the historical record is not indicative, and that newer "Generation III" reactors may be safer by an order of magnitude. This claim is not supported by any empirical evidence since very few such reactors have been constructed; for example, not a single EPR or AP1000 is in commercial operation at the time of writing.
In the absence of data, we are left with the manufacturers' claims that are based on a flawed methodology. These should be treated with skepticism, as recent events in the aviation industry (which inspired the use of PRA for nuclear reactors) show. As part of the certification process for its new 787 "Dreamliner" aircraft, Boeing estimated that its lithium-ion batteries would vent smoke "once in every 10 million flight hours." In fact this event occurred twice in 52,000 flight hours leading to the grounding of the entire fleet for inspection [32] .
Therefore it seems mistaken to accept -at face value, and without adequate empirical evidence -the common claims made by suppliers, that their newer designs are necessarily safer. In this case, the claims are also suspect on theoretical grounds. As we mentioned, once the obvious accident pathways have been eliminated, accident probabilities are dominated by sets of chaotic low probability sequences. So, while new safety features may plug a particular accident pathway, it seems difficult to understand how they could address this fundamental issue.
For the same reason, it appears unlikely that λ would vary significantly across regions. Once good safety practices have been adopted to reduce the risk of accidents down to a certain threshold, they can still happen due to a variety of initiating factors, irrespective of the country.
Before Fukushima, it was common to encounter strident claims that "Western" reactor designs were safer. For example, the World Nuclear Association declared [33] in January 2011 that "In the light of better understanding of the physics and chemistry of material in a reactor core . . . it became evident that even a severe core melt coupled with breach of containment could not in fact create a major radiological disaster from any Western reactor design" (emphasis added). This claim, seemingly based on immutable physical principles, had to be modified after the Fukushima accidents.
A more interesting direction is to refine (4.2) by allowing λ to increase over the lifetime of a single reactor to model the possibility that reactors become more prone to accidents as they age. It would also be interesting to consider the coupling between different reactors in a complex. This would modify the assumption that accidents result from independent Poisson processes, and would remove the need for our parallel analyses featuring two possible methods of including Fukushima in the data. These investigations are left for future work. But we note, in passing, that the nuclear industry implicitly assumes that different reactors in a complex are only weakly coupled, and so there is no safety overhead in installing multiple reactors at a single site.
What implications does this have for policy? The government is planning a large nuclear expansion. It plans to commence construction on 8 heavy water reactors, with a capacity of 5600 MW in the 12
th Plan period (2012-17), and complete work on a separate 2800 MW of installed capacity. It is also planning to import 8 reactors with a total capacity of 10,500 MW [34] . These conventional reactors will quadruple India's existing nuclear capacity.
In addition, the government plans to construct a prototype and two additional fast-breeder reactors and one advanced heavy water reactor. These latter designs are untested. While some theoretical studies have pointed out design defects with the prototype fast-breeder reactor [35] , there is no empirical evidence that this design is even as safe as existing nuclear plants.
These plans have been criticized on several counts. For example, as we have shown elsewhere, it is clear that the cost of electricity from the imported reactors is likely to be several times higher than competing sources [36] .
But more seriously, every reactor site has seen vigorous local protest movements. Apart from issues of land and livelihood, local residents are also concerned about safety. The establishment has dismissed these concerns and has also been intolerant of dissenting views expressed by scientists [37] .
However, our results show that it is imperative to have a frank national conversation on nuclear safety. Such a debate should start with the acceptance that the ambitious claims about nuclear safety made on the basis of probabilistic risk assessment have been conclusively falsified by the empirical data.
